We explore how labor union a¤ects the wealth-income ratio in an innovation-driven growth model and …nd that it depends on the union's objective. If the union is employmentoriented (wage-oriented), then a decrease in its bargaining power would have a positive (an ambiguous) e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio. Calibrating the model to data, we …nd that a decrease in union bargaining power causes a sizable increase in the wealth-income ratio, which explains at least one-third of the increase in the US wealth-income ratio.
Introduction
The following stylized facts in the US are well documented. First, union membership density has declined; see Figure 1 . 1 Second, labor income share has declined; see Figure 2 . 2 Third, the wealth-income ratio has increased; see Figure 3 . 3 This study uses an innovation-driven growth model with labor union to explore how declining union bargaining power (re ‡ecting declining union membership in the data) a¤ects the wealth-income ratio. We …nd that declining union power decreases labor income share and increases the wealth-income ratio. This …nding is consistent with the above stylized facts and also with the negative relationship in Figure 4 between union membership density and the wealth-income ratio across OECD countries. 4 The above results can be explained as follows. A decrease in union bargaining power reduces labor income and increases pro…t income, 5 which in turn increases the value of …rms. This is a positive e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio. However, union bargaining power also has a generalequilibrium e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio through employment and economic growth. The sign of this e¤ect depends on the union's objective. If the union is employment-oriented, then a decline in its bargaining power would lower employment, which reduces the level of R&D and the rate of variety expansion (i.e., the rate at which a …rm loses its market share). This in turn increases the value of monopolistic …rms and the wealth-income ratio. However, if the union is wage-oriented, then the opposite e¤ects prevail. In this case, the overall e¤ect of a decline in union bargaining power on the wealth-income ratio is ambiguous and would be positive if the household's discount rate is below a threshold. Calibrating our model to the data, we …nd that a decrease in union bargaining power leads to a sizable increase in the wealth-income ratio, which explains at least one-third of the increase in the US wealth-income ratio.
Empirical studies often …nd that de-unionization and weaker unions worsen income inequality.
6 Piketty (2014) shows that wealth inequality is an important cause of income inequality and the wealth-income ratio has increased signi…cantly in the US. Thus, this study uses a growth-theoretic framework to explore how union bargaining power a¤ects the wealth-income ratio. Also, we calibrate the model to data to see how large an e¤ect it can have quantitatively.
This study also relates to the literature on innovation and growth. The seminal study by Romer (1990) and many subsequent studies assume a neoclassical labor market. Some studies however explore the e¤ects of labor union on innovation. Palokangas (1996) is an early study and …nds that increasing union bargaining power stimulates growth. In contrast, Boone (2000) …nds that union hurts growth, whereas Ji et al. (2016) …nd that union has both negative and positive growth e¤ects that cancel each other leaving an overall neutral e¤ect. As in Chu et al.
(2016), we …nd that union bargaining power can have a positive, neutral or negative e¤ect on employment and growth depending on the union's objective. This result is similar to Chang et al. (2007) , who consider an AK growth model. Our study di¤ers from Chang et al. (2007) by considering an R&D-based growth model. More importantly, the current study di¤ers from all the above studies by exploring how union a¤ects the wealth-income ratio, in addition to employment and growth which have general-equilibrium e¤ects on the wealth-income ratio.
The model
We modify the R&D-based growth model from Romer (1990) by considering an economy-wide labor union that bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine wage and employment, which a¤ects innovation. The modelling of the union is based on Chang et al. 
Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
c t denotes consumption of …nal good at time t. > 0 is the discount rate. The household maximizes utility subject to
a t denotes …nancial assets (i.e., the equity shares of …rms). r t is the real interest rate. w t is the wage rate. L is the inelastic supply of labor. l t is employment. Therefore, L l t is unemployment, and the unemployment rate is u t 1 l t =L. b t is unemployment bene…t. t is a lump-sum tax. Standard dynamic optimization yields the following Euler equation:
Final good
A unit continuum of …rms produce …nal good y t . The production function is
where ; 2 (0; 1) and + < 1. l t is the employment of labor.
, we assume decreasing returns to scale to allow …rms to earn positive pro…t, 7 which is necessary to facilitate bargaining between the employers' federation and the labor union. The pro…t function of the representative …rm is
where p t (i) is the price of x t (i). The …rm chooses x t (i) to maximize t . The conditional demand function for
Here we depart from the usual treatment and follow previous studies to assume that an economy-wide union bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine wage w t and employment l t . For simplicity, we consider a closed-shop union under which only union members are eligible for employment. Following Pemberton (1988) and Chang et al. (2007) , we consider a managerial union whose objective is jointly determined by the union leaders'desire for a larger membership and the members'desire for a higher wage. Formally, we specify a Stone-Geary objective function:
where ! > 0 measures the weight that the union places on workers'wage income net of unemployment bene…t. ! > 1 (! < 1) implies that the union is wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
The employers'federation and the labor union bargain over w t and l t . The generalized Nash bargaining function is max wt;lt
The parameter 2 (0; 1) measures the bargaining power of the union relative to the employers. The bargaining solutions are 
Di¤erentiated intermediate inputs
Di¤erentiating (11) with respect to x t (i) yields the familiar pro…t-maximizing price given by p t (i) = 1= . To allow for a more realistic quantitative analysis, we introduce an additional markup parameter 2 (1; 1= ), which may capture patent breadth as in Goh and Olivier (2002) or price regulation as in Evans et al. (2003) . In this case, p t (i) = . The demand and pro…t functions are
R&D
Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), we specify a lab-equipment R&D process. Inventing a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs requires units of …nal good. The innovation function is
where R t is …nal good devoted to R&D. Let's denote v t as an invention value. Free entry in R&D implies
The no-arbitrage condition is
which equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset, given by the monopolistic pro…t t plus any potential capital gain _ v t .
Government
The government provides unemployment bene…t and …nances it by a lump-sum tax. The balanced-budget condition is
To ensure balanced growth, we assume unemployment bene…t b t to be proportional to output y t ; i.e., b t = by t , where b > 0 is a policy parameter.
Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium is a time path of allocations fc t ; y t ; x t (i); l t ; R t g, prices fr t ; w t ; p t (i); v t g and …scal policies f t ; b t g such that the following conditions hold at each instance of time:
the household chooses fc t g to maximize utility taking fr t ; w t ; b t ; t g as given;
…nal-good …rms produce fy t g to maximize pro…t taking prices fp t (i)g as given;
an economy-wide federation representing …nal-good …rms bargains with an economy-wide union to determine fw t ; l t g; monopolistic …rms produce intermediate inputs fx t (i)g and set fp t (i)g to maximize pro…t;
R&D …rms choose fR t g to maximize pro…t taking fr t ; v t g as given;
the market-clearing condition for …nal good holds such that y t = R t + N t x t + c t ;
the government balances budget given by t = b t (L l t ).
Employment and economic growth
To solve for equilibrium employment, we substitute (4) and (6) into (5) to obtain
Substituting (18) into the bargaining solution in (10) yields the labor income share given by
which is increasing in union bargaining power . Then, substituting (19) into (18) yields
which is decreasing in . Substituting (19), (20) and b t = by t into the bargaining solution in (9) yields
where employment l is decreasing in the union's wage orientation ! but the e¤ect of its bargaining power depends on the union being wage-oriented or employment-oriented.
Lemma 1 Employment is decreasing (increasing) in bargaining power if ! > 1 (! < 1).
Proof. Use (21).
Assuming positive R&D, we obtain v t = , which in turn implies _ v t = 0. Substituting _ v t = 0 into (16) yields the equilibrium invention value given by
which uses (13) and v = . Finally, from (3), the equilibrium growth rate of consumption is
which is increasing in employment l.
Lemma 2 Economic growth is decreasing (increasing) in bargaining power if ! > 1 (! < 1).
Proof. Use (21) and (23).
Labor union and the wealth-income ratio
In the model, wealth comes from the ownership of two types of assets: a t = a 1;t + a 2;t , where a 1;t = N t v t = N t t =r t is the value of intermediate-good …rms, and a 2;t is the value of …nal-good …rms. Its value follows a no-arbitrage condition: r t a 2;t = t + _ a 2;t , where a 2;t = t = because t grows at the same rate as y t as (20) shows. The equilibrium wealth-income ratio is
From (20), we have
which is decreasing in union bargaining power . From (4) and (13), we derive
which is decreasing in growth g( ) and employment l( ). The second equality of (26) uses (3) and (12), whereas the third equality uses (23).
Substituting (25) and (26) into (24) yields
where l( ) is given by (21). A decline in union bargaining power increases the value of …nal-good …rms =( y). This is a positive e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio, and the magnitude of this e¤ect is decreasing in the discount rate . However, also has a general-equilibrium e¤ect on the value of intermediate-good …rms N =(ry) through employment l and growth g, which a¤ects the rate of variety expansion (i.e., the rate at which a …rm loses its market share) and the value of intermediate-good …rms. The sign of this e¤ect depends on the union's wage orientation !. The following proposition summarizes these e¤ects of on a=y.
Proposition 1 Given ! 1, a decrease in union bargaining power leads to an increase in the wealth-income ratio a=y. Given ! > 1, a decrease in union bargaining power would lead to an increase in the wealth-income ratio a=y if and only if is below a threshold.
Proof. In (27), (1 )(1 )= is decreasing in . From (21) and (23), l and g are increasing in (independent of) if ! < 1 (! = 1). Therefore, a=y is decreasing in if ! 1. As for ! > 1, we di¤erentiate (27) with respect to to obtain
which is negative if and only if is su¢ ciently small. Figure 1 shows that labor income share s decreases from 0.63 in 1978 to 0.59 in 2007. Assuming that this decrease in s is driven by a decrease in , we can calibrate other parameter values and simulate the e¤ect of the decrease in on the wealth-income ratio:
which is obtained by substituting (19) and (26) into (27). Given the importance of the discount rate as shown in Proposition 1, we consider a range of values for 2 [0:03; 0:06]. We consider a markup ratio of 1.25, which takes on an intermediate value of the range reported in Jones and Williams (2000) . 10 We assume a labor intensity of 0.5. We calibrate the value of using a long-run growth rate g of 0.02. We calibrate the value of by matching a wealth-income ratio of 3.74 in the US in 1978. We normalize L to unity and calibrate the value of b using an unemployment rate of 0.07 in the US in 1978. Then, we calibrate the value of ! by matching the decrease in the unemployment rate from 0.07 in 1978 to 0.05 in 2007; see Figure 5 .
11 Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and the simulation results. Figure 6 plots the simulated paths of the wealth-income ratio using the calibrated paths of union bargaining power computed from the HP-…lter trend of the US labor income share in Figure 2 . Under a relatively high discount rate of 0.06, the wealth-income ratio in the model increases from 3.74 in 1978 to 4.27 in 2007, which explains one-third of the increase in the US wealth-income ratio. Under a lower discount rate of 0.03, the wealth-income ratio in the model increases from 3.74 in 1978 to 4.80 in 2007, which explains as much as two-thirds of the increase in the US wealth-income ratio.
Conclusion
We have explored the e¤ects of union bargaining power in an R&D-based growth model and found that a decrease in union bargaining power causes a sizable increase in the US wealthincome ratio. We should emphasize that our quantitative results should be viewed as illustrative given our stylized model. Nevertheless, we believe that our study serves as a useful step towards understanding the relationship between de-unionization and the rising wealth-income ratio. 10 In the online appendix, we explore other parameter values to ensure the robustness of our results. 11 Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Online Appendix
In this appendix, we perform robustness checks on our simulation results. First, we consider a range of values for the markup ratio 2 f1:05; 1:40g as reported in Jones and Williams (2000) . The other parameters are calibrated to the same moments as before. Tables A1 and  A2 summarize the calibrated parameter values and the simulation results, which are largely similar to the results in Table 1 . Finally, we consider other values for labor intensity 2 f0:45; 0:55g. We assume = 1:25 and g = 0:02 as in the paper. The other parameters are also calibrated to the same moments as before. Tables A5 and A6 summarize the calibrated parameter values and the simulation results, which are once again largely similar to the results in Table 1 . 
